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Abstract 
In the process of neoliberal transformation in Turkey, what differentiat-
ed the 2000s from the previous two decades were the block sale privati-
zations of large-scale state enterprises such as P E T K I M , Turk Telekom, 
T U P R A § , and E R D E M I R . These block sales, the conditions of which 
were shaped by political struggles at different levels, were also constitu-
tive political and ideological moments per se, helping to reproduce a par-
ticular perception of social reality at the expense of others. This paper 
will overview and critically problematize the privatization processes of 
these four enterprises, all completed under the successive A K P govern-
ments in power since 2002. By focusing on the apparently technical and 
economic aspects of the block-sale processes, such as valuation, efficiency 
enhancement and marketing, the paper calls into question the increased 
concerns over their transparency, and wonders whether such concerns 
can be understood as attempts to mask the substantially corrupt nature 
of capitalist relations of production, which inescapably makes itself felt 
during these processes. 
Keywords: Privatization, Turkey, neoliberalism, AKP, large-scale state 
enterprises. 
2 0 0 5 was an except ional year in t h e pr iva t iza t ion process in T u r k e y ; 
t h e bu lk of t h e shares of t h e t h r ee large-scale a n d highly prof i table 
s t a t e - o w n e d en terpr i ses , name ly T i i rk Te l ekom , T U P R A $ , a n d t h e 
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£ E R D E M I R Group, were sold by block sales to, respectively; Oger Tele-
= corns Joint Venture in July for $6.55 billion, Koc-Shell Joint Venture in 
2 September for $4.14 billion, and OYAK in October for $2.77 billion.1 
2 At the time, Turk Telekom was the incumbent fixed-line state telecom-
p munications monopoly, T U P R A S was the country's largest industrial 
£ enterprise with four oil refineries and 28.1 million tons of annual crude 
5 oil processing capacity,2 and the E R D E M I R Group owned 80% of the 
9 iron ore reserves in Turkey.3 The specific characteristics of the enterpris-
z es concerned inevitably led to great public interest in their privatizations. 
Moreover, the government in office was the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP), the Islamic political preferences of which had been per-
sistently questioned since the Party's rise to power in November 2002, 
and concerns over the possibility of AKP's utilizing this opportunity to 
strengthen its socio-economic base through the sale of these enterprises 
to so-called "green capital" attracted further attention to the issue.4 This 
was the reason why the whole process provoked a sharp controversy in 
the media among pro- and anti-AKP circles. Additionally, the privatiza-
tion of these three giants, together with the privatization of P E T K I M , 
another large petrochemical company the block sale of which could not 
be finalized in its first tender in 2003, were among the stand-by com-
mitments of the government to the IMF, meaning that the fund was also 
observing the process closely. 
As this overview of the political atmosphere surrounding the privati-
zation year of 2005 implies, the sales of large-scale and profitable state 
enterprises are controversial processes involving multi-level political 
conflicts and concerns. Privatizations through the block sale method 
further increase the potential for conflict, as this leads to a direct change 
in the ownership and management structure of the enterprises con-
1 Formal information about the privatization processes of these enterprises can be found in the annual 
activity reports of the Privatization Administration (OiB). The block sales were concluded for 55% of 
Turk Telecom, 51% ofTUPRAJ, and 46.12% of the ERDEMiR Croup. See T.C. Ba§bakanhk Ozellejtirme 
Idaresi Bajkanhgi, "Yaymlar," http://www.oib.gov.tr/yayinlar/yayinlar.htm. 
2 Turkish Petroleum Refineries Corporation, "About TUPRAJ," http://www.tupras.com.tr/detailpage. 
en.php?IDirectorylD=i03. 
3 ERDEMIR, "About Us: Our Profile," http://en.erdemir.com.tr. 
4 See Bagimsiz Sosyal Bilimciler, Bagimsiz Sosyal Bilimciler 2007 Y1I1 Raporu: 2007 llkyazmda Dunya ve 
Turkiye Ekonomisine Bah} (Ankara: Turk Muhendis ve Mimar Odalari Birligi, 2007), 75-80, http://www. 
tmmob.org.tr/resimler/ekler/eo1938fc48a2cfb_ek.pdf. 
5 The Stand-By agreement signed with the IMF for the period May 2005 to May 2008 set strict targets 
for the privatization of the most profitable state-owned enterprises in Turkey. Article 33 of the Letter of 
Intent submitted to the IMF in April 2005 envisaged the privatization of PETKlM, TUPRA?, ERDEMiR, 
and Turk Telekom by the end of 2005. See Government of Turkey, "Letter of Intent and Memorandum 
of Economic and Financial Policies," (April 26, 2005), 14 http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2005/ 
tur/042605.pdf. 
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cerned, with important implications for the workers and managers, as 
well as for competition in the relevant sectors. 
The diverse political implications of these conflicts seem to have 
given rise to a novel kind of academic interest in the privatization pro-
cess in Turkey, which had hitherto been analyzed mainly on technical 
and economic grounds, from either supportive pro-market or critical 
statist perspectives.7 In a recent study, Balkan-$ahin has analyzed how 
the process in the 2000s was shaped by hegemonic struggles among 
different social forces, including business organizations, trade unions, 
and the A K P government.8 In another study, Onis has focused on the 
changing relative power and discourse of what he calls the pro- and anti-
privatization coalitions, problematizing the legal and institutional con-
text within which the privatization process has taken place in Turkey.9 
The apparent novelty of these recent studies is that, in contrast to earlier 
works in which a pro- or anti-privatization position used to be explic-
itly or implicitly adopted on the basis of various technical or economic 
calculations, these latter try to underline the political underpinnings of 
privatizations as processes shaped by conflicting political and economic 
interests. 
While the accurate emphasis made in these recent studies on the 
constitutive role of politics in the processes of privatization deserves at-
tention, these most recent studies' treatment of privatizations as means 
and/or instruments helping to strengthen or weaken different social 
actors and/or processes still overlooks the very political character of 
the privatization processes per se. In other words, privatization, when 
understood as "a major instrument of public enterprise reform or a 
6 Methods used in privatization processes have varied among different countries. As Simga-Mugan and 
Yiice remind us, while mass privatizations through the distribution of shares to the public for free or for 
a minimal charge were preferred in the so-called "transition" countries to ensure a speedy transformati-
on in property relations, in the established capitalist countries, block sales, public share offerings, sale of 
assets, trade sales, sale of equity, sales on the open market, employee buyouts, or build-operate-transfer 
methods have all been applied in combination. See Can Simga-Mugan and Ayse Yiice, "Privatization in 
Emerging Markets," Emerging Markets, Finance and Trade 39, no. 5 (2003): 85. 
7 One study by Arin and Ulubasoglu is a good example of the former kind: See K. Peren Arin and 
Mehmet Ali Ulubasoglu, "Leviathan Resists: The Endogenous Relationship between Privatization and 
Firm Performance," Public Choice 140, no. 1-2 (2009). See also Cevat Karatas and Metin Ercan, "The 
Privatisation Experience in Turkey and Argentina: A Comparative Study, 1986-2007," METU Studies in 
Development 35, no. 2 (2008). For a statist critical approach to privatizations, see Erinc Yeldan, As-
sessing the Privatization Experience in Turkey: Implementation, Politics and Performance Results, Report 
submitted to the Economic Policy Institute (Washington, DC: 2005). 
8 Sevgi Balkan-§ahin, "Privatization as a Hegemonic Process in Turkey," Journal of Contemporary Euro-
pean Studies 18, no. 4 (2010). 
9 Ziya Onis, "Power, Interests and Coalitions: The Political Economy of Mass Privatization in Turkey," 
Third World Quarterly 32, no. 4 (2011). 
10 Ibid., 707. 
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£ "global trend .. or particular idea" adopted by different actors,11 acquires 
= a political meaning only in relation to the political processes and /or 
z
 struggles externally related to it. This paper intends to problematize the 
E privatization process as a political and ideological moment within which 
p a particular perception of social reality is reproduced in opposition to 
£ others. This will be attempted by focusing on different moments of the 
2 block sale privatizations of P E T K I M , Turk Telekom, T U P R A $ , and 
j E R D E M I R , all completed during the successive A K P governments in 
z power from 2002 to 2008.1 2 
To this end, overviewing the basic neoliberal arguments used to le-
gitimize privatization processes is a necessary starting point. As well 
known, the general neoliberal approach to the issue tends to make sense 
of privatizations on the basis of a simple cost-benefit analysis where the 
sale of state enterprises would arguably save the state from various bur-
densome expenditures, and benefit society through increased competi-
tion and efficiency. However, this neoliberal conclusion is reached by the 
different lines of argument followed by Monetarism, Public Choice The-
ory and Agency Theory. The Monetarist justification for privatization 
emanates from the general assumption that state intervention should be 
minimized as excess intervention leads to the malfunctioning of inher-
ently efficient markets.13 Hence, public enterprises should be privatized 
and start operating under market principles. The Public Choice version 
of neoliberalism has suggested that it is indeed "governmental-political 
failure" which distorts the working of the market.14 O n account of this, 
privatization is regarded as the perfect solution to overcome government 
failure and political decision-makers' abuse of their power over state 
enterprises, arising from their self-interested nature.15 Finally, Agency 
Theory has problematized the relations between the state and enter-
prise managers as one of principal-agent relations, in which the prin-
cipal faces difficulties in deeming the agent responsible for seeking the 
interests of the principal.16 This problem has been attributed either to 
i i Balkan-Jahin, "Privatization," 483-484. 
12 For a more detailed overview of these privatizations as well as that of POAS, see Merih Angin, "Turk-
ish Experience in Privatization: The Privatizations of Large-Scale State-Economic Enterprises in the 
2000s" (Unpublished MSc Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2010). 
13 This perspective was shaped by the Chicago School of Economics led Milton Friedman in the 1970s. 
For a monetarist analysis of privatizations, see Coskun Can Aktan, Privatization and the Turkish Experi-
ence (Ankara: Seckin Yaymcilik, 2004). 
14 James M. Buchanan, Liberty, Market and State, Political Economy in the 1980s (New York: New York 
University Press, 1985), 256. 
15 Mary M. Shirley, "Bureaucrats in Business: The Roles of Privatization versus Corporatization in State-
Owned Enterprise Reform," World Development 27, no. 1 (1999): 129. 
16 Ibid., 116. 
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the fact that enterprise managers have low incentives for efficiency and •* 
high discretionary power,17 or that political interference distorts manag- •» 
ers' incentives, leading to over-employment and underinvestment.18 O n 5 
the basis of these arguments, neoliberal perspectives have commonly " 
justified the privatization of state-owned enterprises by making claims < 
for their improved after-sale performance, even though not all empirical £ 
data necessarily prove this. * 
However, the ideological power of these arguments has not simply » 
rested on their persistent reproduction by neoliberals at such theoreti- < 
cal levels; these arguments have been internalized in the real processes 
of privatization by many—not necessarily neoliberal—actors, and have 
become practices that have helped redefine the meaning of the state, the 
legitimate conditions to ensure efficiency and the fair levels of price; 
hence, a specific form of "normality" based on capitalist market ratio-
nality. The very political nature of privatization processes is reflected 
in their reproduction of a specific pro-capital "normality," which in turn 
helps draw the boundaries between the legitimate and illegitimate, the 
just and unjust and the corrupt and uncorrupt in capital-labor-state re-
lations. The more visible these practices are, the more widespread their 
"educative" impact becomes.20 Hence, what has made the four selected 
privatization processes worth analyzing is, besides other reasons, their 
visibility. 
The methodology of this study is Gramscian in the sense that mate-
rial, political and ideological forms are understood as internally related 
and inseparable elements of social totality, which is itself subject to con-
tinuous change in relation to class struggles fought to reform or trans-
17 Narjess Boubakri et al., "Privatisation in Developing Countries: Performance and Ownership Effects," 
Development Policy Review 26, no. 3 (2008): 278. 
18 See Rafael La Porta and Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, The Benefits of Privatization: The Evidence from 
Mexico, Working Paper 6215 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1997), http:// 
www.nber.org/papers/w6215. 
19 Having examined the performances of nine companies privatized by 2003, and in which the Turkish 
state used to have over 50 percent ownership, Simga-Mugan and Yiice argue that there occurred no 
improvement in the after-tax profits of these companies after the privatizations, and that none of 
them could achieve good financial performance: Simga-Mugan and Yiice, "Privatization in Emerging 
Markets," 105. On the other side, Karatas and Ercan claim that Turk Telekom ensured efficiency and 
labor productivity gains after its privatization: "The Privatisation Experience," 369. 
20 On the constitution of the public-private divide in the Ottoman Empire through a series of "cor-
ruption" trials made in the immediate aftermath of the 1840 Criminal Law, Kirh draws attention to 
Gramsci's definition of "hegemony" as an "educative" relationship through which the "right," and the 
"wrong" are redefined. See Cengiz Kirh, "Yolsuzlugun icadi: 1840 Ceza Kanunu, iktidar ve Biirokrasi," 
Tarih ve Toplum, no. 4 (2006). See also Antonio Cramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. 
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (New 
York: International Publishers, 1971), 350. 
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600001734
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 14:28:37, subject to the Cambridge Core
144 Merih Angm and Pinar Bedirhanoglu 
£ form its constitutive forms in the real process of history.21 Gramsci's 
=> stress on social totality is expressed best in his formulation of a "historic 
z bloc in which precisely material forces are the content and ideologies are 
2 the form."22 To understand how dominant classes win consent to their 
p rule from those they dominate, Gramsci developed the conception of 
£ "hegemony," which requires the creation of a new common sense around 
£ a "collective national-popular will" through the functioning of ideology 
s as the organic "cement" welding together a historic bloc.23 According to 
z Williams,24 it is a moment: 
in which the philosophy and practice of a society fuse or are in equi-
librium; an order in which a certain way of life and thought is domi-
nant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society 
in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its 
spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, 
and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral 
connotation. An element of direction and control, not necessarily 
conscious, is implied. 
Hence, in Gramsci's concept of "hegemony," ideology becomes lived, ha-
bitual practice, rather than an abstract "system of ideas" and encompass-
es both unconscious dimensions of social experience and the workings 
of formal institutions.25 It is indeed only in this way that it can bind 
together classes and class fractions, which are in positions of dominance 
and subordination in relation to each other. 
This article intends to highlight the neoliberal ideological proposi-
tions that have been habitually reproduced during the privatization pro-
cesses of P E T K I M , Turk Telekom, T U P R A $ , and E R D E M I R . It is 
hence important to recognize that neoliberal arguments on privatization 
acquire a particular ideological power when translated into a technical 
21 Jackues Texier, "Gramsci, Theoretician of the Superstructures," in Gramsci and Marxist Theory, ed. 
Chaltal Mouffe (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979); David Forgacs, ed. A Gramsci Reader. 
Selected Writings 1916-1935 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2000); Esteve Morera, Gramsci's Histori-
cism (London: Routledge, 1990); Stephen Gill, "Epistemology, Ontology and the Italian School," in 
Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, ed. Stephen Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993). 
22 Gramsci, Selections, 377. 
23 Ibid., 181-182. 
24 Gwyn A. Williams, "The Concept of'Egemonia' in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci: Some Notes of 
Interpretation," Journal of the History of Ideas 21, no. 4 (i960): 587. 
25 Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991), 112-115. 
26 Gramsci, Selections, 328; Stuart Hall et al., "Politics and Ideology: Gramsci," in On Ideology, ed. Center 
for Contemporary Cultural Studies (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1977), 48. 
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and economic language. This is a language within which state-capital-la-
bor relations are perceived through efficiency, productivity, or profitabil-
ity trends, graphs, and/or levels as if they can be analyzed on an objective 
ground isolated from politics. This is a language that has been shaped by 
and acquired meaning from the perspective of capital and capitalist com-
petition, hence it necessarily prioritizes particular questions over oth-
ers. Questions related to the real life conditions of laborers, for instance, 
cannot even be formulated in this language. However, this technicized 
presentation of social reality can sometimes mean totally the opposite of 
what is implied when rethought in relation to other dynamics. Take for 
instance the frequently referred to statistics on "privatization revenues": 
contrary to what such figures imply, it is rather questionable whether 
there is ultimately any real revenue that can be registered to states' bud-
gets due to privatizations. Simga-Mugan and Yiice argue that expendi-
tures made for privatizations generally almost totally eat away the rev-
enues.27 While reminding that governments might write off debts of or 
make new investments in the enterprises to be privatized, Karatas and 
Ercan warn that the OIB in Turkey discloses no information on such ex-
penditures, making it impossible to calculate what is really earned out of 
the privatization process.28 Moreover, given the fact that almost half of 
the claimed revenues acquired from privatizations are then re-invested 
in the enterprises to be privatized, privatization becomes almost a loss-
making activity. 
This article will thus attempt to contest the specific capitalist"normal-
ity" reproduced in and through the privatization processes of P E T K I M , 
Turk Telekom, T U P R A § and E R D E M I R by underlining the class na-
ture of some apparently technical and economic practices and/or dis-
courses adopted in relation to efficiency and valuation controversies. 
Besides this, it will also highlight the sort of a "mercantile" image of the 
state persistently legitimated throughout these privatization practices. 
To these ends, the article will firstly stage a short discussion of the 
privatization process in Turkey up to the 2000s. Then the specificities of 
the block sales of the four state-owned enterprises will be problematized 
through a detailed overview of the P E T K I M case, and a selective reading 
of the Turk Telekom, T U P R A $ , and E R D E M I R cases. Re-narrating 
the whole block sale process of P E T K I M from start to finish is intended 
27 Simga-Mugan and Yiice, "Privatization in Emerging Markets," 103. 
28 Karatas and Ercan, "The Privatisation Experience," 355. 
29 Ibrahim Turkmen, "Turkiye 2005'te 18 Yila Bedel Ozellestirme Yapti," Zaman, July 15, 2005. Turkmen 
informs us that OlB re-invested 47% of privatization revenues in the enterprises to be privatized in 
2005. Interestingly, Turkmen uses this figure as support for his pro-privatization arguments. 
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£ as a historical critique in support for the arguments developed in this 
= article. This historical analysis is followed by an analytical discussion of 
z
 how a specific perception of the state as well as efficiency and valuation 
£ considerations have all been approved and reproduced during the block 
I sales of Turk Telekom, T U P R A S , E R D E M I R , and P E T K I M . 
U 
UJ 
a 
°j Privatization processes in Turkey until the 2000s 
^ Privatization has been an indispensable, though not a persistent, com-
z ponent of the neoliberal restructuring of the Turkish state, for the priva-
tization of state-owned enterprises was not given priority in the Turkish 
structural adjustment program in the early 1980s. The emphasis in 
those years was more on their reform, arguably required to increase their 
efficiency and productivity. 
Hence, in contrast to those implemented in many post-Soviet coun-
tries in the 1990s, the Motherland Party (ANAP) government under 
the leadership of Turgut Ozal, who is known as the architect of neolib-
eralism in Turkey, did not adopt a shock-therapy approach in privatiza-
tion. Instead of directly privatizing the state-owned enterprises, Ozal 
preferred initially to issue revenue sharing certificates (GOSs) , a method 
totally different from the direct sale of enterprise assets. In the G O S s , 
there was no transfer of public assets to the private sector, and it worked 
more like a different form of public borrowing. The first G O S s were 
offered in December 1984 and January 1985, respectively raising the 
revenues for the first Bosphorus Bridge, and the Keban Dam and Hy-
droelectric Power Station.32 
Despite these early steps, however, privatization could acquire prior-
ity in Turkey only after 1987, during Ozal's second term in office. As 
Onis outlines, the first major case of divestiture took place in February 
1988 with the public offering of the shares of Teletas, a telecommunica-
tions company. The initial confidence regarding the success of this priva-
tization declined later with the steady fall of the value of Teletas shares 
in the capital markets. The failure in the Teletas case led to the conclu-
30 Calip L Yalman, Transition to Neoliberatism: The Case of Turkey in the 1980s (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi 
University Press, 2009), 329. 
31 Contrary to the claimed low efficiency of state-owned enterprises, Turel points out Ercan Uygur's find-
ings, which suggest that labor, capital and total factor productivity growth in state-owned manufactur-
ing enterprises in Turkey were no worse than that in private manufacturing companies in 1965-1988. 
See Oktar Turel, "Restructingthe Public Sector in Post-1980 Turkey: An Assessment," in The State and 
Clobal Change: The Political Economy of Transition in the Middle East and North Africa, eds. Hassan 
Hakimian and Ziba Moshaver (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001), 188. 
32 Ziya Onis, "The Evolution of Privatization in Turkey: The Institutional Context of Public-Enterprise 
Reform," International Journal of Middle East Studies 23, no. 2 (1991): 167. 
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sion that the capital market in Turkey was not advanced enough for such <« 
a big transfer operation.33 Following that failure, the government started •<• 
to look for alternative methods to implement privatizations. The direct £ 
sale of state assets to the private sector was found to be the second-best n 
policy implemented in the late 1980s, seen in the privatization processes < 
of five cement plants owned by ( J ITOSAN, the airplane services com- £ 
pany USA5j>, and Bogazici Airlines, which were all purchased by foreign * 
companies.34 £ 
This new trend of selling state enterprises to foreign capital by block ™ 
sale was criticized by various business circles in Turkey. Placing Sumer-
bank and particularly P E T K I M under the privatization agenda led to 
harsh criticism on the grounds that the decision undermined "national 
sovereignty."35 The opposition of business groups, such as the Turk-
ish Industry and Business Association ( T U S I A D ) , was based on their 
concerns over increased competition due to the involvement of foreign 
investors to the process.36 In return, the A N A P government tried to 
justify the block sales to foreign investors on the grounds that they at-
tracted foreign investment, which would bring in "technology and mana-
gerial expertise." 
The political atmosphere in the 1990s was rather different than that 
in the 1980s due to the dissonant coalition governments succeeding one 
another up to the 2002 elections. The period is also characterized by 
the persistent fiscal crisis of the state, which governments attempted to 
overcome through privatizations rather than tax revenues. It goes with-
out saying that this time most of the business interests supported this 
policy,38 even though inter-state controversies between coalition part-
ners or different state institutions prevented the finalization of the sales 
of large state enterprises such as the Milk Industry Corporation (SEK), 
Turk Telekom, P E T K I M , and Turkish Airlines. 
The currency crisis of 1994 forced the incumbent government to 
adopt an IMF stabilization program on April 5 t h which put great em-
phasis on the need to privatize state-owned enterprises.39 This brought 
33 Ibid., 167-168,171. 
34 Karatas and Ercan, "The Privatisation Experience," 172. 
35 Onis, "The Evolution of Privatization," 172. 
36 Ibid., 173. 
37 Marcie J. Patton, "Constraints to Privatization in Turkey," in Privatization and Liberalization in the Mid-
dle East, eds. Iliya Harik and Denis ). Sullivan (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), 114. 
38 Tiirel, "Restructing the Public Sector." 
39 Merih Celasun and Ismail Arslan, "State-Owned Enterprises and Privatization in Turkey: Policy, Per-
formance and Reform Experience, 1985-95," in State-Owned Enterprises in the Middle East and North 
Africa: Privatization, Performance and Reform, ed. Merih Celasun (London: Routledge, 2001), 232. 
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JJ onto the agenda the need for an appropriate legal and institutional base 
= for privatizations, which had been managed up to then through govern-
z
 ment decrees on a trial-and-error basis. The outcome was Privatization o 
2 Law No . 4046 in November 1994, which created the Privatization High 
p Council (OYK) as the"ultimate decision-making body for privatization," 
£ the OIB as the "executive body for the privatization process, reporting 
2 directly to the Prime Minister," and the Competition Authority (CA).4 0 
s Ercan and Onis argue that this law was also enacted to meet the require-
z ments of entry to the EU Customs Union.4 1 Nevertheless, the Constitu-
tional Court continued hindering the privatization process by annulling 
the contradictory clauses of the Privatization Law with the rulings on 
valuation techniques. To meet this challenge, first an amendment was 
made in 1997, and then the concept of privatization was incorporated 
into the Constitution in 1999.42 
Still, in the unstable political atmosphere of the 1990s, systematic 
implementation of neoliberal policies, including privatizations, proved 
impossible, although the ultimate privatization of the petroleum giant 
Petrol Ofisi (POAS) by a statist-nationalist coalition in 2000 signaled 
that Turkey's arguable "lost decade" was about to come to an end.43 
This constituted a milestone in the privatization process in Turkey as 
it marked the start of the block sales of large-scale state enterprises.44 
Still, the ideal conditions for a renewed neoliberal assault were created 
by the 2000-2001 economic crisis. Besides bringing the A K P to power, 
this crisis also meant increased international pressure on the Turkish 
state for neoliberal institutionalization; a conjuncture which also forced 
the new government to undertake the sale of large-scale profitable state 
enterprises under hard-nosed international scrutiny. 
40 Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Privatization Administration, "Privatization Endeavor in Turkey," 
T.C Basbakanhk Ozelle§tirme idaresi Bajkanhgi, Basin ve Halkla llijkiler Daire Bajkanhgi, http://www. 
oib.gov.tr/yayinlar/publications.htm. 
41 Metin R. Ercan and Ziya Oni§, "Turkish Privatization: Institutions and Dilemmas," Turkish Studies 2, 
no. 1 (2001): 116. 
42 Ibid., 122. 
43 51% of the shares of POAJ were sold to the I5 Bank-Dogan Holding Consortium in March 2000 in re-
turn for only 1.260 Billion US dollars. Later enjoying the laxities of the tender agreement, Dogan Hold-
ing had managed to acquire the control of the 92.98% of the company by 2005. See Harun Ciirek, 
"POAS'ta Yeni Skandal," Aksam, October 18, 2002; izak Atiyas, "Recent Privatization Experience of 
Turkey. A Reappraisal," in Turkey and the Global Economy. Neo-Liberal Restructuring and Integration 
in the Post-Crisis Era, eds. Ziya Onis, and Fikret Senses (London: Routledge, 2009), 104-105; Angin, 
"Turkish Experience in Privatization," 38-48. For a discussion of Turkey's "lost decade," see Pmar 
Bedirhanoglu and Calip L. Yalman, "State, Class and the Discourse: Reflections on the Neoliberal 
Transformation in Turkey," in Economic Transitions to Neoliberalism in Middle-income Countries, eds. 
Alfredo Saad-Filho and Calip L. Yalman (New York: Routledge, 2010), 115. 
44 Ercan and Onis, "Turkish Privatization," 110. 
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As this historical overview indicates, there was no operational har- m 
mony within the Turkish state45 on the question of the privatization of •» 
large-scale state enterprises up until the 2000s, and various inter-state £ 
conflicts thus prevented a systematic policy implementation. Still, the n 
enactment of the Privatization Law in 1994, immediately after the eco- < 
nomic crisis, has to be recognized as a reflection of changing social and £ 
political dynamics in Turkey under the "coercive" transformative pres- * 
sures of the crisis.46 It is no doubt that the 2001 crisis had a similar % 
effect on Turkish political economy with specific implications on the 5 
privatization process. This, however, should not lead us to underesti-
mate the historical specificities of the A K P government which has ul-
timately turned privatizations into a systematic policy option in Turkey 
in the 2000s. 
Privatization of large-scale state enterprises by AKP governments 
The A K P has been a dedicated proponent of privatization in Turkey 
since the Party's first years in office. Such a stand was adopted after the 
Party's establishment in 2001 through the careful abandoning of the de-
velopmentalist perspective of the National View, the Islamist current 
out of which the A K P cadres had developed.47 Immediately before the 
privatization season in 2005, Erdogan was arguing that privatization 
was not a way to sell the loss-making public enterprises to the private 
sector, but was an instrument that had consequences beyond this. As he 
asserted, they were favoring privatization because they embraced an un-
derstanding of the state which was stronger and more active in fulfilling 
its fundamental functions accurately.48 
The AKP's support for the privatization of large-scale profitable 
state-owned enterprises can also be rethought, besides the Party's ideo-
logical commitment to neoliberalism, in relation to its politically vulner-
45 This is not to be read as meaning that the state is autonomous from capitalist interests. The policies 
of the Turkish state, which historically reproduces itself within capitalist relations of production, are 
shaped at a particular moment in time by both the structural dynamics of capitalism in general, and 
the conjunctural and conflictual interests of different capital groups in particular. 
46 Bonefeld attracts attention to Benjamin's argument that a coercive moment before the moment of 
rule of law is necessary. As he maintains, "[l]aw cannot be applied to chaos-law requires order; ... 
Order needs to be imposed so that law can rule. The imposition of order makes possible the codifica-
tion of social relations and their regulation on the basis of the rule of law. Imposition of order has the 
force of law. The rule of law presupposes the force of law, that is, violence is a law-making power and 
a law-preserving power." This argument, which is proposed to make sense of military interventions as 
"constitutional" moments in capitalist development, can be rethought in relation to the rather violent 
and transformative economic crises. See Werner Bonefeld, "Democracy and Dictatorship: Means and 
Ends of the State," Critique 34, no. 3 (2006): 243-244. 
47 ilhan Uzgel, "AKP: Neoliberal DoniisCimun Yeni Aktorii," Miilkiye Dergisi^o, no. 252 (2006). 
48 "Baykal: Kirvesi mi Akilli, Erdogan mi?," Milliyet, May n , 2005. 
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£ able position within the state, particularly during its first term in office. 
= This was a period in which the A K P was in government but not in pow-
z er due to the Islamists' long and careful exclusion from strategic state 
2 posts, such as those in military. By contrast, at the international level, 
^ there was a welcoming but cautious attitude towards the AKP's power-
£ ful rise to government. This was welcomed as a development that would 
2 ultimately help establish the "strong state" capable of implementing neo-
s liberal policies in Turkey, while the Islamist character of the Party still 
z created concerns.49 Within such an atmosphere, the A K P had a special 
incentive to remain loyal to the targets of the neoliberal agenda, for this 
would increase confidence in the Party at the international level and en-
sure an uninterrupted flow of short-term finance into the country, lead-
ing in return to its empowerment in domestic politics. The privatization 
process of the large-scale state enterprises, which had long been on the 
agenda of international financial institutions as well as the EU, gave the 
A K P the chance to make a big show to this end, turning the block sales 
of P E T K I M , Turk Telekom, T U P R A S and E R D E M I R into "prestige" 
cases. 
The Block Sale of PETKIM 
The privatization of P E T K I M was a rather long process that started in 
January 2003 and was finalized in May 2008. It is important to note that 
the privatization processes of Turk Telekom, T U P R A S , and E R D E M I R 
were all completed in between these dates. Hence, overviewing the sale 
of P E T K I M in detail will enable us to analyze the changing political-
economic dynamics affecting the conditions of privatization processes in 
Turkey throughout the 2000s. 
The first tender for the block sale of P E T K I M was launched in Janu-
ary 2003, just three months after AKP's coming to power, as previously 
scheduled by the OIB. 5 0 Despite the expectations of a much higher 
price, it became clear in June 2003 that Standart Kimya, owned by the 
Uzan Group, had won the tender by offering just US $605 million for 
88.86% of the P E T K I M shares.51 This was a rather interesting result 
as Cem Uzan, who was the leader of the Gene; Party, had been one of 
AKP's rivals in the 2002 general elections. 
49 Uzgel, "AKP." 
50 The OiB had already declared in September 2002—before the elections—that 51% of the shares of 
PETKiM would be sold in block. "PETKiM Ekim'de satisa cikiyor," Milliyet, September 25, 2002. 
51 "PETKlM'e En Yiiksek Fiyati Uzanlar Verdi," Milliyet, June 7, 2003. About a week before the highest of-
fer was announced, the head oftheOlB, Metin Kilci, had somehow declared that not 51% but 88.86% 
of the shares of PETKiM were going to be sold. See "Tamami Satiliyor," Milliyet, May 30, 2003. 
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Even though Erdogan himself declared his disappointment with the *> 
sale price, the tender result was successfully used as an opportunity to t> 
demonstrate the AKP's approval for market dynamics and disregard " 
for political concerns. In reaction to the opposition parties' criticisms n 
against PETKIM's block sale under IMF pressure,52 Erdogan argued < 
that if governments ask for loans, it was the right of the I M F to set £ 
conditions to ensure that the debt would be paid back. H e attacked the * 
opponents of the IMF program and privatization by stating that "to be » 
against the IMF means living in another galaxy" and that "unfortunately, ™ 
there [were] remnants of the communist world in Turkey."53 
Various circles, including Petrol-Is (Petroleum Workers' Union), the 
Turkish Chemical Manufacturers Association, and the C H P (Republi-
can People's Party), criticized the low contract price and payment condi-
tions, claiming that P E T K I M had been sold for an amount lower than 
its turnover of the previous year.54 Indeed, the consulting firm hired by 
the OIB, Trichem Consultants, had previously estimated the value of 
P E T K I M as $3.2 billion,55 so the head of the OIB Metin Kilci also 
declared that he wished the amount to be between one and five billion 
dollars.56 Regardless of the ongoing tender process on the other side, 
Erdogan had somehow already started re-marketing P E T K I M to for-
eign businessmen.57 
Despite these criticisms, OYK approved the block sale of P E T K I M 
to the Uzan Group on the condition that Standart Kimya should pay 
40% of the price in advance.58 Some columnists appreciated this as a 
sign of government's objectivity in tenders, even though it was also an-
nounced that the Uzan Group, which was in sharp competition with 
Nokia and Motorola at that time, was not expected to find the credit to 
pay the required cash. It was argued that the approval of the sale would 
help increase the confidence of foreign investors to make offers in the 
prospective privatizations of T U P R A S and TEKEL. 5 9 Hence, Abdul-
lah Gul, who was then the Minister of Foreign Affairs, also argued that 
52 Indeed, Abdi i l lat i f Jener, who was then responsible for privatizations, stressed that questions con-
cerning privatizations were constantly inquired after dur ing IMF visits. See "6zel le$t i rmede Cezai 
Sorumluluk Kalkacak," Milliyet, February 12, 2003. 
53 "PETKlM Degerinin £ok Al tmda," Milliyet, June 10, 2003. 
54 See "Tayyip'i Alana Unakitan Bedava," Milliyet, June 7, 2003; "PETKlM' in Sat i j i 900 Milyon Dolann 
Altmda Yapilmamah," Milliyet, June 18, 2003; "PETKiM Degerinin £ok Al tmda." 
55 "Fiyati Tarti j ihyor," Milliyet, June 8, 2003. 
56 "PETKiM'de GSnii lden Cecen 1 Milyar Dolar," Milliyet, June 11, 2003. 
57 "ihalesi Yapilmis. PETKlM'e Yabanciyi ^ag i rd i , " Milliyet, June 15, 2003. 
58 "OYK, PETKiM'in Sat i j in i Onayladi," Milliyet, July 1, 2003. 
59 Meral Tamer, "Hukumete PETKiM Icin Aferin," Milliyet, July 2, 2003. 
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£ the interests of the country and politics were two different things.60 
= As expected, Standart Kimya failed to fulfill the obligations set by the 
z
 OYK, so the tender was canceled.61 
2 After the failure of the first tender, Finance Minister Kemal Unakitan 
p became engaged in active marketing abroad to ensure the sale of P E T K I M 
£ in the next round.6 2 The tender process for the block sale of 88.86% of 
£ PETKIM's shares re-opened on August 26, 2003, but was canceled due 
^ to an insufficient number of bids.63 Moreover, P E T K I M declared that 
z it had made a loss of TRY215.5 trillion in 2003.6 4 It was later declared 
that, owing to new investments made amounting to TRY100 trillion, 
P E T K I M had made a profit of T R Y 8 1 trillion in a six-month period.65 
Following further investments, the enterprises production capacity was 
declared to exceed three million tons.6 6 These investments were justified 
by claims that the more the enterprise grew, the more valuable it would 
become, resulting in higher revenue raised from its sale. 
Between the second and the third tenders for P E T K I M , four sig-
nificant years passed throughout which the block sales of Turk Telekom, 
T U P R A $ and E R D E M I R were completed, endowing the A K P with 
not only confidence but also experience in the management of the priva-
tization processes. 
In PETKIM's third tender on July 5, 2007, 5 1 % of the enterprise's 
shares were initially sold to TransCentralAsia Petrochemical Holding 
Consortium (formed by Troika Dialog, a Russian investment bank, and 
two Kazakh companies, namely Caspi Neft and Investment Industrial 
Group Eurasia). The price offered was $2.05 billion, which was nearly 
three times higher than PETKIM's market value and six times higher 
than the contract price of the first tender.68 This time, however, the am-
biguity of the major companies forming the consortium led to various 
concerns69 that ultimately, without stating any reason, the OIB decid-
60 "Ulke Menfaati Farkh Siyaset Farkli Istir," Milliyet, July 13, 2003. 
61 Republic ofTurkey Prime Ministry Privatization Administration, "Portfolio: PETKiM Petrokimya Hold-
ing A.S.," http://www.oib.gov.tr/portfoy/petkim/petkim_index_eng.htm. 
62 "PETKiM'de Miisterinin Ayagina Kadar Cittiler," Milliyet, September 6, 2003. 
63 "Portfolio: PETKiM." 
64 "Degerli TL PETKiM'e Yaramadi," Milliyet, April 6, 2004. 
65 "PETKiM'de ikinci Randevu," Milliyet, November 6, 2004. 
66 Giingdr Uras, "PETKiM Kotii Degil, lyi Bir KlT idi (Satin Alan Haynni Gorecek)," Milliyet, July 6, 2007. 
67 "Unakitan: Biiyiiterek Ozellestirecegiz," Milliyet, February 8, 2005. 
68 "Portfolio: PETKiM." 
69 It was later revealed that Caspi Neft was owned by a U.S.-based company, whose market value was 
only 187 million US dollars, and that the main financier behind the Investment Industrial Group Eur-
asia was TuranAlem, a rather opaque partnership. Other claims and/or concerns were that Russian 
Troika Dialog was one of the biggest financial powers behind the Armenian diaspora, that one of the 
four offices of Troika Dialog is on the Greek side of Cyprus, and that neither of the companies forming 
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ed on 16 October to sell 5 1 % of PETKIM's shares to the Socar and •» 
Turcas-Injaz Joint Venture,70 which made the second highest offer with •» 
$2.04 billion.71 The reason was not questioned at that time by the IMF, 5 
even though the fund had closely observed the previous block sales of n 
Turk Telekom, T U P R A S and E R D E M I R . For the IMF, the shift of 5j 
attention to the subprime mortgage market collapse in the U S in 2007 £ 
had made investigating Turkey's various other macro-economic indica- * 
tors more important than the observing of the privatization process. *> 
In such an atmosphere, the new buyers of P E T K I M were highly " 
appreciated by some columnists because, first of all, Socar, established 
more than 150 years ago, owned a 25% stake in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
pipeline. Right after winning the tender, Socar declared that they were 
planning to invest in a refinery. It was also announced that, even though 
Turkey had been importing petrochemical products to meet 75% of her 
demand, Socar was planning to decrease this amount to 30% as a result 
of their investments.73 
The decision of the O l B was challenged by Petrol-Is, the authorized 
trade union in P E T K I M , on the grounds that it was illegal for Turcas 
to attend the tender because there had been a year's state tender ban on 
Turcas Petrol after it gave false documents in an earlier tender held by 
General Directorate of Highways. W h e n the OIB stated that there was 
no impediment to Turcas partaking in the tender,74 Petrol-Is filed a mo-
tion for stay of execution of the tender specifications, together with the 
decisions of the OYK and the O lB . Accordingly, the Plenary Session 
of the Administrative Law Divisions of the Council of State found the 
request of the Union apposite and issued the stay of execution on the 
grounds that there was no public interest as P E T K I M had been profit-
ing with its increased capacity on account of the state investments and 
the increasing demand for petrochemical products.7 5 Ultimately, Petrol-
Is's request of a stay of execution and annulment of the decision of the 
OYK to sell P E T K I M to Socar and Turcas-Injaz Joint Venture was re-
the consortium had any experience in the petrochemical industry. For details, see "Alia Iki Kazak Bir 
Rus," Milliyet, July 6, 2007; Metin Munir, "Sahibi Belli Degil Jirketler £emberinde PETKiM," Mitliyet, 
October 6, 2007; "PETKiM Satisina OYK'dan Onay," Milliyet, November 23, 2007; "Ahcilann Mali 
Giicu Hakkinda Bilgi Yok," Milliyet, July 8, 2007. 
70 This was a joint venture formed by the Azerbaijani petroleum company, Socar, Turcas Petrol, es-
tablished in 1988 by British Burmah Castrol and the joint stock company formed by TLirkpetrol and 
Lubricant Oils, and the Saudi Arabian investment company, Injaz Projects Company Limited. 
71 "PETKlM'de Kazaklar Devre DISI, lhale Azeri - Turk Ortakhginda," Milliyet, October 17, 2007. 
72 Metin Munir, "PETKlM'de Top Turcas ve Azerilerde," Milliyet, October 18, 2007. 
73 "PETKlM'in Yeni AIICISI Rafineri Kurmak istiyor," Milliyet, October 18, 2007. 
74 "PETKlM'de 'Yasakli $irket' Tartismasi," Milliyet.com.tr, November 29, 2007. 
75 "Danistay: PETKlM'in Satismda Ustiin Kamu Yaran Yok," Milliyet.coiri.tr, January 12, 2008. 
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£ jected by the 13 t h Chamber of the Council of State, and the sales agree-
= ment for the transfer of 5 1 % of PETKIM's shares to Socar and Turcas-
z Injaz was signed on May 30 ,2008. The joint venture paid $1,660 billion 
« of the contract price in advance.76 
p This overview of the privatization of P E T K I M reveals that the pro-
Si cess was persistently subject to various political interventions at its dif-
2 ferent moments, despite the bold claims about its depoliticized char-
9 acter. Questions, however, remain unanswered: such as why P E T K I M 
z was sold to the Uzan Group despite the obvious impossibility of the 
realization of the purchase, why the enterprise was ultimately sold to 
Socar and Turcas-Injaz rather than Trans Central Asia, and why this 
happened despite the corruption allegations raised by Petrol-Is against 
Turcas. Whatever the answers to these questions might be, the story 
above reveals that a level of political intervention is indeed almost inevi-
table in this process. As this is so, one should question the ideological 
implications of the persistent calls made by neoliberals for an imagined 
depoliticized market sphere. It appears that the more the politicized na-
ture of market relations become visible in such large transactions, the 
more political reflexes to prove the opposite are required. 
The block sales of Turk Telekom, TUPRA$, and ERDEMiR 
Most of the issues publicly raised during the block sale process of 
P E T K I M were also widely debated during the privatizations of Turk 
Telekom, T U P R A S , and E R D E M I R . Hence, besides the conventional 
neoliberal arguments, such as the expected rise in efficiency and pro-
ductivity levels, and the potential revenues, the nationalities of the pro-
spective buyers, the strategic importance of the privatized enterprises, 
and various corruption claims became the hottest topics in these de-
bates. Analyzing the way these debates were constructed is important, 
for, beyond various implications of the block sales on different political 
and economic processes, the discourses and practices engaged in during 
these block sales have turned them into political moments in themselves, 
within which a particular "normality" in capital-labor-state relations was 
persistently reproduced. 
To start with, it is important to mention that P O A S , T U P R A S , and 
P E T K I M used to be the subsidiaries of the Turkish Petroleum Corpo-
ration (TPAO) , established by the state in 1954 with the aim of con-
structing a vertically integrated petroleum company to operate across the 
entire supply chain, from hydrocarbon exploration, drilling, production 
76 "Ekonomide Yihn Olaylan-ll," Milliyet, December 17, 2008. 
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and refinery to marketing and transportation.77 Thus the privatization 
of these enterprises in the 2000s meant a substantial restructuring of 
the petroleum sector in Turkey. The privatization process of T U P R A S 
started in 1989, when the 49% of the company's shares were handed 
over to the Mass Housing and Public Participation Fund. 
O n the other side, the E R D E M I R Group, established in 1960, was 
the biggest industrial corporation of Turkey in terms of total assets, with 
its nine subsidiaries. Eregli Demir Celik, located in Eregli in the Black 
Sea region, was the parent company of the group, and the largest flat 
steel manufacturer of Turkey. At one point, the group owned 80% of 
iron ore reserves in Turkey.80 The privatization process of E R D E M I R 
had started in 1987, though the A K P re-vitalized it in 2005. 
Lastly, the importance and profit generating capacity of Turk Tele-
kom was self-evident since it was—and still is—the only fixed line com-
munications company in Turkey. Its privatization had been on the agen-
da since the 1990s, though the lack of a regulatory framework impeded 
this. In 1993, Prime Minister Tansu Ciller had tried to sell the l as t "T" 
of P T T (Turkish Post, Telegraph and Telephone), which, according to 
her, would end domestic indebtedness; at that time approximately $14-
16 billion.81 
It is interesting to note that attempts to increase the value of these 
three already valuable state-owned enterprises were made through new 
investments, led by the state prior to their privatizations. In September 
2001, T U P R A S and P E T K I M signed a protocol to transfer P E T K I M s 
Yarimca facilities to T U P R A S for $60 million. Following this, 50.98% 
of shares in D I T A S (Marine Operations and Tanker Management Co., 
another subsidiary of T P A O ) were also sold to T U P R A S for $16.5 
million in October 2002.8 2 Moreover, T U P R A S had an ongoing Mas-
ter Investment Plan of $2.1 billion, covering the 1999-2006 period, to 
modernize the existing plants and to increase competitive capacity, and 
77 Turkish Petroleum Corporation, "History of TPAO," http://www.tpao.gov.tr. 
78 Turkish Petroleum Refineries Corporation, "About TUPRAJ." 
79 These are: Iskenderun Iron and Steel Works Co. (ISDEMlR), the long steel manufacturer; ERDEMlR 
Maden, which has reserves in Sivas and Malatya-Hasancelebi; Turkey's only seamless steel pipe plant 
Celbor in Kmkkale; ERDEMiR Romanya, the siliceous steel plant in Romania; Erenco, which offers 
investment and engineering service for iron and steel investors; ERDEMlR Lojistik, which provides 
logistics services; ERDEMlR Celik Servis Merkezi, the steel service center for cold product cutting and 
slitting in Cebze; and ERDEMlR Gaz that was established to meet the group's need of gas. 
80 ERDEMlR, "About Us: Our Profile." 
81 Fikret Bila, "PTT'nin T'siyken Satsaydik Makus Talihimizi Yenerdik," Milliyet, July 4, 2005. 
82 Petrol-lf Arajtirma Servisi, Turkiye'de Rafmaj Sektoruniin Tarihi ve TUPRA$: Ilk Modern Tests Batman'da 
Kuruldu Cumhuriyet Strateji, May 16, 2005, 31. 
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£ launched to meet EU Environmental Legislation.83 Yeldan states that 
= more than half of this investment was realized by 2005 and "with the 
2
 planned installation of a new refinery with 10 million tons/year, it [was] 
£ expected that the enterprise [would] create employment for 1,000 new 
p workers."84 E R D E M I R , on the other hand, completed its Capacity Ex-
£ pansion and Modernization Investments in 1996, amounting to $1.5 
2 billion, and one of the biggest industrial investments in Turkey. In 1998, 
3 the New Port Facilities initiative that would construct one of the biggest 
z ports of the Black Sea was launched. The enterprise also started up pro-
duction on its T in /Chrome Plating Plant in 1999, and Galvanizing Line 
in 2001. 8 5 In 2001 again, it acquired C O S T S.A., Romania's siliceous 
steel plant,86 followed by the purchases of I S D E M I R in 20028 7 and 
Div-Han Divrigi Hekimhan Madenleri, a mining enterprise in 2004.8 8 
Finally, coming to Turk Telekom, the company formed a consortium 
with Koc Holding to purchase 65% shares in Bulgarian Telecom, which 
eventually failed due to the sale of the latter to the US private equity 
fund Advent International.89 
The question of ascertaining the appropriate value of these enterpris-
es during the block sales led to significant controversies. A tender for the 
block sale of a 55% share in Tiirk Telekom was made in July 2005, and 
Oger Telecoms Joint Venture won the bid.90 The privatization agree-
ment gave Oger Telecoms the opportunity to transfer control of Tiirk 
Telekom to any other corporation without notifying the relevant Turk-
ish authorities.91 Later, when the net profit Tiirk Telekom made in 2004 
was calculated, it became clear that the annual profit of the company 
was alone sufficient to cover the installments of the block sale. Hence, 
immediately after the block sale, the new General Director of Tiirk Tele-
kom declared that company was not planning to make any extra invest-
ments; meaning that the company's existing revenues were enough to 
pay the installments. Following this declaration, Oger Telecoms paid the 
83 Ibid., 30. 
84 Yeldan, Assessing the Privatization Experience, 21. 
85 ERDEMiR, "About Us: Our History," http://en.erdemir.com.tr. 
86 "ERDEMiR Romanyada Fabrika Satin Aldi," Milliyet, August 23, 2001. 
87 "ISDEMlR, ERDEMiR'e Bugun Devrediliyor," Milliyet, February 1, 2002. 
88 "Div-Han Madenleri ERDEMlR'in," Milliyet, March 5, 2004. 
89 "Oger Bulgar Telecomu Aliyor," Telekomcular Dernegi (2011), http://www.telekomculardernegi.org.tr/ 
haber-2227-oger-bulgar-telecomu-aliyor.html. 
90 This was a consortium led by Saudi Oger, which was owned by the Lebanese Hariri family and Tele-
com Italia—the largest Italian telecommunications company, also a shareholder of Avea. See Repub-
lic of Turkey Prime Ministry Privatization Administration, "Privatization of Turk Telekom," http://www. 
oib.gov.tr/telekom/turk_telekomunikasyon.htm. 
91 Miyase llknur, "Telekom'da Turkiye By-pass Edildi," Cumhuriyet, June 7, 2006. 
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remaining installments of $4.3 billion in advance, and much earlier than 
the required date. The common criticism voiced in relation to this de-
velopment was that Turk Telekom was privatized before the necessary 
measures had been taken to impede monopolization. 
T h e tender for the block sale of a 5 1 % share of T U P R A S was held 
in September 12, 2005 and won by the Koc-Shell Joint Venture Group 
for $4.14 billion. This price was found satisfactory by many as, in its 
first unsuccessful tender process in 2004, T U P R A S had been about to 
be sold to the Zorlu-Efremov consortium for only $1,302 billion for a 
65.76% share.93 W h e n the C H P had tabled a motion and asked wheth-
er $1.3 billion was really an appropriate price for T U P R A S , the State 
Minister at the time, Ali Babacan, had replied that the price had been 
correctly formed by market conditions.94 Hence, the price attained in 
the second tender was thought to ipso facto justify the cancellation of the 
earlier bid following the legal objections raised by Petrol-Is and the au-
thorized workers union in T U P R A S . 9 5 As expected, Petrol-Is filed mo-
tions for stay of execution of the second sale as well on the grounds that 
although the privatization of T U P R A S was based on the necessity of 
investment, this provision was not included in the agreement. Petrol-Is 
emphasized the procedure that was implemented in ERDEMIR's priva-
tization, where the OYK took measures to guarantee 95% continued 
employment, continuation of existing investments, and the closure of 
integrated facilities, thus overseeing the protection of minority rights, 
and the union underlined that these measures were not being taken 
in the privatization of T U P R A S . 9 6 Yet the Council of State declined 
the request of annulment and the block sale of T U P R A S was finalized 
without further amendment.9 7 
The differentiating characteristic of ERDEMIR's block sale process 
were the excessive debates around the nationality of the potential buy-
ers. Indeed, even though the question of nationality was also used in 
the T U P R A S sale by the Koc Group; when it was declared that it was 
planning to attend the tender only for the sake of impeding the Rus-
sian petroleum companies, who had already become a monopoly in 
92 Metin Miinir, "Oger Telecom Korunuyor Mu?," Milliyet, April 28, 2007. 
93 "TUPRAS'a 1.3 Milyar Dolar," Milliyet, January 14, 2004. 
94 "Unakitana Tataristan Sorusu," Milliyet, January 16, 2004; "TfjPRAS ihalesinde Diizgiin Fiyat Olustu," 
Milliyet, January 25, 2004. 
95 "TOPRAJ'in Satisi iptal," Milliyet, November 27, 2004. 
96 "iste TUPRAS'ta Satisi Durduran Dilekce...," Milliyet, February 4, 2006. 
97 "Danistay'dan TOPRAJ'in Ozellestirilmesine Vize," Milliyet, May 9, 2006. Due to Petrol-is's request 
for a revision of the decision, the process was to be completed in November, 2008. 
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JJ Bulgaria, this was seen as a pragmatic strategy to win the tender. In 
= the E R D E M I R tender, however, there was sharp controversy over this 
z question. Firstly, the managers of E R D E M I R opposed the block sale 
2 by arguing that the shares could be privatized via public offering, citing 
p examples of enterprises that work to a private sector logic under state 
£ control, such as the Korean group C O S C O . " Yilmaz Kaya, a C H P 
jj M P and member of the"Erdemir Commission," also emphasized that it 
9 would be a grave mistake to sell E R D E M I R , which was, together with 
z its subsidiaries, the eighth largest steel producer in the world, making an 
approximate profit of $650 million annually. H e asserted that potential 
foreign buyers would most probably downsize the enterprise to reduce 
its competitive power, creating a disaster for Turkish industry.100 The 
president of Turk Metal (Turk Metal Workers' Union), Mustafa Ozbek, 
pointed out that none of the advanced industrialized countries, neither 
Japan nor Germany, had allowed foreign companies to take control of 
their integrated iron and steel industries. H e added that E R D E M I R 
was supplying 40% of Turkey s flat steel demand, and that, by 2025, Tur-
key would be in need of nine more enterprises of ERDEMIR's capacity. 
Therefore, if E R D E M I R was sold to foreign companies, Turkey s future 
and growth would be left to the mercy of foreigners.101 One of the other 
concerns of Turk Metal regarding the sale of E R D E M I R was that one 
of the potential buyers, Mittal Steel Company N.V., was known for its 
policy of reducing the number of workers right after acquiring a new 
company.102 In reaction to such concerns, Erdogan declared openly that 
the government was seeking foreign capital involvement in E R D E M I R 
as national companies buying state enterprises had traditionally ex-
ploited the state. Metin Kilci, the head of the OIB, also took this posi-
tion by arguing that the growth of iron and steel companies via merg-
ers was the global trend, that this was an unprecedented opportunity 
for ERDEMIR's privatization,103 and that they would be glad to sell 
E R D E M I R to foreigners.104 Later, Kemal Unakitan approved the gov-
ernment's inclination towards foreign buyers by arguing that they want-
ed to save the public from the "mess" created by the politicians' concerns 
to use state enterprises to employ their relatives or increase employment 
98 "TOPRAJ'a Rus Firmalar Cirerse, Biz de Gireriz," Milliyet, May 1, 2003. 
99 "ERDEMiR'de Fiyat ve BlokTartismasi," Milliyet, February 2, 2005. 
100 Melih Asik, "iste AbdiilsansQr," Milliyet, April 28, 2005. 
101 Hasan Pulur, "Kizimiz Davulcuya, Zurnaciya Kajmasin!," Milliyet, May 18, 2005. 
102 Nail Cureli, "ilhami Soysal'dan ERDEMlR'e," Milliyet, June 29, 2005. 
103 "Kilci: ERDEMiR'de Tarihi Firsati Yakaladik," Milliyet, May 27, 2005. 
104 "ERDEMlR iscisinden Takvime Gore Eylem," Milliyet, August 6, 2005. 
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for private gain and votes, respectively.1 The possibility of the sale of ^ 
E R D E M I R to foreigners even led to the formation of a national con- ^ 
sortium, named E R D E M I R Consortium, with the coordination of the 5 
•A 
Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) . r, 
The president of TOBB, Rifat Hisarciklioglu, made it clear that he was < 
not against privatization and foreign investment, but that, to become £ 
global players rather than mere subcontractors, Turkish companies had * 
to unite and win the tender of ERDEMIR. 1 0 6 It is interesting to note, 5 
however, that although many called this consortium the "national team," " 
many of the companies in the consortium, such as Assan and Borusan, 
actually had foreign partners.107 OYAK, the Turkish Armed Forces As-
sistance (and Pension) Fund, participated in the struggle to impede for-
eign companies, but did not join the consortium. As a matter of fact, 
OYAK had already declared that it would definitely buy one of the state 
enterprises up for privatization, and the sale of any of these strategic 
enterprises to OYAK would be an assurance for the Turkish public.108 
The General Manager of OYAK, Coskun Ulusoy, argued that, if these 
strategic enterprises were definitely going to be sold, then they should be 
acquired by patriots.109 
The tender of E R D E M I R was ultimately won by OYAK despite 
powerful rivals such as Mittal Steel, and Arcelor, and the fund purchased 
46.12% of E R D E M I R s shares for $2,770 billion.110 This price was 86% 
higher than the stock-exchange value of ERDEMIR. 1 1 1 The confron-
tation also led to stricter tender provisions, as it was a condition that 
the buyer would not reduce staffing below 95% of existing level for two 
years following the transfer, and that it had to make new investments in 
E R D E M I R and I S D E M I R that would enable additional production 
of 3.5 million tons. The specifications also granted veto to the state on 
important matters.112 After all these confrontations that took place on 
the question of "nationality," OYAK's announcement that the company 
was planning to transfer to Arcelor a 4 1 % share of the Ataer Holding, 
the company established to take delivery of the transferred E R D E M I R 
105 "Kime Satihrsa Satilir Sana Ne! Maasini Al Karijma...," Milliyet, August 10, 2005. 
106 "Global Olmak icin ERDEMiR'i Istiyoruz," Milliyet, July 18, 2005; "Tiirkler Amele mi Olsun?," Milliyet, 
August 17, 2005. 
107 "ERDEMlR Savajlan," Milliyet, August 23, 2005. 
108 "Uc Sirketten Birini Mutlaka Alacagiz," Milliyet, May 27, 2005. 
109 "ERDEMlR'in Yuzde 20'si Arcelor'un Olacak...," Milliyet, December 30, 2005. 
110 Based on the tender specifications, OYAK also had to purchase the 3.17% of ERDEMiR's shares 
owned by the Development Bank of Turkey. Therefore, OYAK ultimately paid $2.96 billion for a total of 
49.29% of the shares. See "Ayse Askere Gitti," Milliyet, October 5, 2005. 
111 Ibid. 
112 "Yabanci: Cilgin Fiyat Vermeyiz Yerli: ipi Biz Gogusleriz," Milliyet, October 4, 2005. 
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£ shares, led to considerable public outcry. OYAK later abandoned this 
= decision, declaring that they would not accept any partnership unless 
z they had full control over the management.113 Still, the fact that such a 
^ transfer was considered possible by OYAK has to constitute a warning 
p about the weak bases of nationalist considerations in the processes of 
u . . . £ privatization. 
5 This hot debate on the question of the nationality of the bidding 
s companies can be interpreted as a survival strategy driven by workers 
z and other possible losers, rather than as an argument with real sub-
stance. In the Turk Telekom tender, which was the first large-scale 
privatization won by a "foreign" joint venture, the workers perceived no 
immediate threat from the privatization due to the provision that 1,117 
state workers of the enterprise were to be transferred to other public en-
terprises.114 It is also interesting that no such concern about nationality 
dominated the sale of Turk Telekom. One possible answer is that, up to 
the Tiirk Telekom case, no such big state enterprise had ever been sold 
to "foreigners," and there might have been an expectation that such a sale 
would anyway be canceled. To the surprise of many, this did not happen, 
and the block sale was finalized. Hence, it is important to recognize that 
the block-sale processes of T U P R A S and E R D E M I R took place after 
this experience, and, in the E R D E M I R case, besides the opposition of 
the workers, small and medium-scale industrial companies dependent 
upon ERDEMIR's iron and steel pursued a nationalist strategy against 
the sale of the company to Mittal Steel or Arcelor. The nationality-based 
criticisms made in the P E T K I M tender in 2007 have to be rethought 
in relation to this background, though it never became evident whether 
the nationalities of the potential buyers really affected the cancellation. 
The privatization processes of large state enterprises as ideological moments 
T h e changing form and content of the political struggles that shaped the 
privatization processes of Tiirk Telekom, T U P R A S , and E R D E M I R 
can tell us much about the changing historical trends in Turkish politi-
cal economy. Besides this however, these privatizations have also had a 
constitutive political impact, for they have also turned into ideological 
moments within which the capitalist market has been praised as the 
main legitimate regulative framework in capital-labour-state relations. 
It is thus necessary to focus on the specific perception of the state, and 
the considerations of efficiency and valuation approved and reproduced 
113 "ERDEMiR'de Kaptan Kojkunu Birakmayiz," Miliiyet, March 4, 2006. 
114 "Oger Sartlara Uyarsa Turk Telekom'u Ahr," Miliiyet, July 7, 2005. 
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during the block sales of Turk Telekom, T U P R A § , E R D E M I R , and ' 
P E T K I M . * 
m 
Firstly, the process as a whole has consolidated a specific idea of 5 
the state, as a collective subject whose reflexes in the act of privatiza- o 
tion are not very different from those of a private merchant trying to < 
market his/her products. The active marketing tours made by Kemal £ 
Unakitan in Russia, the UK, Germany, and the oil rich Gulf countries in * 
the P E T K I M case, or the invitations sent by the OIB to thirty-nine iron S 
and steel manufacturers of the world to participate in the E R D E M I R 5 
block sale were telling examples in this sense.115 The best interpretation 
is that these were endeavors to create a competitive sale process to en-
sure higher prices, and this simply strengthens the image of a "merchant 
state" in search of higher profits. O n the other hand, the fact that the 
marketed "products" were indeed inherited from previous generations 
also adds a prodigal quality to this image, an interpretation that should 
not necessarily be read as an appreciation of so-called developmental-
ist states. These relatively new characteristics of the Turkish state can 
be understood as reflections of the ever increasing subordination of the 
state to capital in the historical development of capitalism; a tendency 
which is not peculiar to Turkey.116 The non-problematic internalization 
of such an understanding of state by the A K P governments has consoli-
dated this subordinate role of the Turkish state as the new "normality." 
Another important reflection of this subordination can be identified in 
the efficiency arguments developed in relation to the block sales analyzed. 
The efficiency issue in these privatization processes has mainly reflected 
concerns for the necessity of a substantial change in the content of the 
labor force. This has been ensured by the elimination of arguably excess 
workers later replaced by new ones employed under "flexible" conditions. 
Karatas and Ercan attract attention to the drop in the number of workers 
employed in Turk Telekom from 51,737 at the end of 2005 to 37,035 by 
the end of 2007.117 Much of this drop was caused by about 10,000 of Turk 
Telekom's state workers exercising their right to be transferred to other 
public services.118 It would be naive to assume that the story was radi-
cally different under the "patriotic" OYAK administration of ERDEMIR; 
when E R D E M I R declared a loss amounting to TRY 1.2 billion in the last 
115 "Aktif Pazarlama'ya Rusya'dan Basladi," Milliyet, April 27, 2003; "ERDEMiR, Yabanci Goriicuye 
Cikiyor," Milliyet, January 7, 2004. 
116 See Dag MacLeod, "Privatization and the Limits of State Autonomy in Mexico: Rethinking the Ortho-
dox Paradox," Latin American Perspectives 32, no. 4 (2005). 
117 Karatas and Ercan, "The Privatisation Experience," 370-371. 
118 Ibid., 366-367. 
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£ quarter of 2008, the company declared that it had to lay off workers due to 
= the economic crisis.119 The deal made later between OYAK, Turk Metal, 
z and the Turkish Employer's Association of Metal Industries (MESS) pre-
« vented the layoffs by cutting the wages of 7,025 workers by about 35% 
j : for sixteen months.120 Wha t such moments apparently teach us is sim-
£ ply the legitimacy of eliminating and/or restructuring the conditions of 
^ the labor force according to companies' profitability concerns. This basic 
s capitalist reality is obviously not new, though its harsh implications for 
z the real-world conditions of laborers necessitate persistent reproduction 
of this practice as "normal," and the block-sale processes of the large state 
enterprises have provided ample opportunities for this. 
Last but not the least, the already-questioned valuation processes 
during the block sales need to be further problematized in terms of 
their reproduction of a pro-capital normality. Indeed, deep concerns on 
the inappropriateness of the ultimate sale prices in most of the cases is 
evidence of the incompatibility of the exchange value set by the mar-
ket for these enterprises with an average sense of equity. Rather than 
comparing and contrasting sale prices with other technical indicators of 
value, we need to recall, for instance, that the purchase of T U P R A S by 
Koc Holding has meant the appropriation by the latter of a company 
which was as big as itself in terms of the holding's annual revenues.121 
It is thus not so strange that, following this purchase, Koc made a sharp 
change in its conventional strategy of proximity to the consumer by 
selling M I G R O S . So neither this nor OYAK's sale of OYAKBANK 
after ERDEMIR's block sale should be found strange, given the epoch-
making impact of the purchases of these giant state enterprises on these 
companies.122 Similarly, the purchase of P E T K I M led to a total recon-
sideration of the investment strategies of Socar and Turcas, such that 
in May 2010, Socar and Turcas announced that they had relinquished 
the refinery project in Ceyhan on the grounds that their priority was 
the P E T K I M refinery.12 It needs to be recalled that, rather than seeing 
such practices of immediate enrichment as ordinary/normal/accepted 
aspects of market dynamics, Boratav et al. define them as corrupt and 
119 Ersin Ercan and Sertan Aydemir, "Kriz, ERDEMiR'i de Vurdu: 250 i§?i Qkanlacak," Milliyet, March 10, 
2009. 
120 Sertan Aydemir, "Sendika 1400 ijciyi Krize Kurban Etmedi 7025 (^alijanin Maaji Yuzde 35 indi," Hiir-
riyet, April 23, 2009. 
121 Ozgiir Oztiirk, Turkiye'de Biiyiik Sermaye Cruplan, F'mans Kapitalin Olu$umu ve Celifimi (Istanbul: So-
syal Arastirmalar Vakfi, 2010), 229. 
122 Melis Senerdem, Koc TUPRA§ Borcunu Azaltip Yeni Projeleri Kovalayacak Fortune Turkiye, October 
2007; Cungor Uras, "OYAK Yonetimi Bankayi 'Mecburiyetten' Satti," Milliyet, June 20, 2007. 
123 Uras, "OYAK Yonetimi Bankayi 'Mecburiyetten' Satti." 
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predatory within the context of state-capital relations in Turkey, and >» 
Harvey as moments of "creative destruction" at a more general level. •<• 
90 
V) 
•o 
Conclusion: Beyond the transparency vs. corruption divide " 
The possibility that corrupt practices and relations might have accom- < 
panied the privatizations of P E T K I M , Tiirk Telekom, T U P R A $ , and £ 
E R D E M l R had been a serious concern since the beginning of these * 
processes. In response to such considerations, the OIB tried to assure =o 
the transparency of the tenders by broadcasting them live over T V " 
channels. Even though this did not prevent the many corruption claims 
and criticisms directed against them, these privatizations were finally 
praised by various international organizations, including the I M F and 
the O E C D , for their transparency and expected positive impact on the 
flow of foreign direct investment to Turkey.125 
This article has consciously neglected the various allegations of cor-
ruption made during the block-sale processes of the four state-owned 
enterprises as making an analysis on the basis of the conventional defini-
tion of corruption would have devalued its main arguments.126 Howev-
er, the above overview should have implied that various suspicious con-
nections and coincidences could easily have taken place in the block-sale 
processes. The problem with focusing on such claims is that this very 
endeavor creates the illusion that once such claims are proved to be base-
less, the transaction itself comes to be accepted as legitimate and right. 
This is indeed exactly what this article has tried to refrain from. For 
no matter how properly these allegations are investigated—though in 
most cases they are not—this is anyway done within the legal forms and 
boundaries defined by capitalist relations of production, so that such in-
vestigations generally serve to enhance the limits of the ethical acceptabil-
ity of the latter. Hence, rather than focusing on these surface appearances, 
this article has tried to attract attention to the substantially corrupt, inhu-
man, and unjust nature of capitalist relations of production which appear 
124 Korkut Boratav et al., "Kamu ijletmeleri ve Ozellestirme Deneyimi: Sorunlar ve Politika Secenekleri," 
Toplum ve Bilim, no. 77 (1998): 120-121; David Harvey, "Neo-liberalism as Creative Destruction," Geo-
grafiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography 88, no. 2 (2006). 
125 See International Monetary Fund, Turkey: 2007 Article IV Consultation - Staff Report; Public Informa-
tion Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Turkey, IM F 
Country Report No. 07/362 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund 2007), 37; Angel Gurrla, 
Presentation of the OECD Economic Survey of Turkey, 2006 edition (Ankara: 2006), http://www.oecd. 
org/turkey/presentationoftheoecdeconomicsurveyofturkey20o6edition.htm; http://www.oecd.org/ 
document/2i/o,3746,en_33873io8_33873854_3756o98i_i_i_i_i,oo.html. 
126 The conventional definition of corruption is "use of public office for private gain." For a mainstream 
neoliberal discussion on corruption, see Arvind Jain, K.r "Corruption: A Review," Journal of Economic 
Surveys 15, no. 1 (2001): 73. 
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£ in flashes within the most ordinary and arguably technical practices of 
= these large-scale privatizations, though do so only if we manage to ques-
z tion what is simply taken for granted, or has become habitual. The obses-
£ sion with the "transparency" of such large transactions should be seen as 
p an attempt to prevent and get away with this, and thus constitutes the 
£ most important ideological moment of these privatization processes. 
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